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In November 2008 Professor Mike
Richards issued his much awaited re-
view of the British Department of
Health’s policy on out-of-pocket pay-
ments (‘‘top-ups’’) for drugs not ap-
proved as cost effective by the
National Institute for Health and Clin-
ical Excellence (NICE). The policy
stated, or had been construed as stat-
ing, that those who top up thereby
became ineligible for further National
Health Service (NHS) treatment for the
condition targeted by the drug.1 For
instance, if a lung cancer sufferer
bought Avastin, which is not NICE
approved, she could no longer receive
free treatment for her cancer on the
NHS’s tab. Richards, the National Can-
cer Director, recommended that the
policy be repealed. From an ethical
point of view, this change should be
enthusiastically welcomed.
This is not to doubt, as some have,
whether unfettered access to unap-
proved drugs will lead to increased
inequalities in healthcare access be-
tween the rich and the poor. Rather,
one should question whether ethics
permits the use of a penalty on top-
ping-up in order to prevent such in-
equalities. Supporters of the penalties
on topping-up policy make two main
points in its favor.2 First, tiered health-
care systems in which some healthcare
is available only to those able to pay
are unjust. Second, injustice aside, the
private purchase of drugs should be
disincentivised in order to prevent
deterioration of the NHS’s ability to
deliver high-quality healthcare. For in-
stance, it stands to reason that a robust
private market in drugs will drive up
the price of currently existing drugs
and discourage the development of
drugs that meet NICE’s cost-effective-
ness standard. This would leave the
NHS handicapped in its effort to pro-
vide cost-effective drugs. Furthermore,
there is a legitimate concern that the
NHS will be stuck footing the bill when
those who buy unapproved drugs end
up needing treatment for the side
effects of those drugs. In addition, there
is the worry that too much topping up
will cause support for robust, compre-
hensive public provision to wane. The
idea is that if the wealthy are permitted
to pay for drugs, without penalty,
when they need them, then they will
be less likely to see themselves as
needing the NHS. At the same time
the less wealthy will be sapped of their
enthusiasm for the NHS as they begin
to perceive that they are not receiving
the highest quality care available.
With regard to the first point, it is not
entirely obvious that a two-tiered
healthcare system, in which everyone
has free access to NHS care and some
have the opportunity to top up with
private care, would be unjust. In such
a system, either the NHS delivers all
the healthcare to which citizens are
entitled to as a matter of justice, or it
does not. If it does, then those who
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cannot afford to top up have no basis for
complaint. If it does not, then those who
cannot afford to top up have a valid
complaint regardless of whether others
top up. After all, top-ups by the affluent
do not make the less affluent any less
healthy.3
To avoid this dilemma, it would have
to be claimed that the entitlement is not to
any absolute level of healthcare, but
rather to equal provision of healthcare
at any level. This proposal seems to be
egalitarian, but is it really? We know
quite well who is favored by a system
that mandates that everyone have access
to the exact same health services: the
people who, for whatever reason, are
less apt to get sick. There is, of course,
nothing we can do to eliminate varia-
tions in susceptibility to disease and
injury. Nevertheless, it seems positively
inegalitarian to exacerbate the problem
by putting out of reach the one remedy
that the more illness prone would other-
wise have: the option to add private
medical care to their NHS coverage.
Taking up the second point, some
have questioned whether easier access
to unapproved drugs will undermine
support for the NHS in light of the fact
that there is already a thriving private
healthcare market in Britain.4 Others
doubt that drug prices will rise as
a result of increased topping up,5 and
still others are optimistic that a tiered
healthcare system can be designed
such that the public tier can be in-
sulated from additional costs owing
to the presence of a private tier.6 Sup-
pose, however, that topping-up penal-
ties really were necessary to prevent
these harms to the NHS. Is the preser-
vation of a robust NHS so crucial that it
would then be right to impose such
penalties? Ironically, it is the very im-
portance of the NHS that suggests that
the answer is no. Presumably, the NHS
is important because it delivers to
citizens something to which they are
entitled as a matter of justice: compre-
hensive healthcare at no charge. But if
this truly is something to which one is
entitled, then threatening to withhold
it unless certain demands are met (i.e.,
no topping-up) constitutes extortion.
If, on the other hand, quality state-
sponsored healthcare is not an entitle-
ment, then one can hardly object when
others behave in ways that lead to
reduced support for it.
The case for tiering—and, by exten-
sion, topping up—is simple. Every
citizen of a relatively wealthy country
has a claim, based in justice, to a com-
prehensive set of health services.7 In
addition, however, each citizen also is
endowed with a broad liberty to use
her money as she wishes, as long as
doing so is compatible with the secur-
ing of justice. Consequently, there
should be a private healthcare system
in addition to a public system. In the
British context, it has been argued that
a penalty for topping up is necessary to
protect the public system. This may very
well be the case, but protecting the
public system by threatening to revoke
access to it for those who top up seems
perverse. Such a radical response to the
problem would be ethically justifiable
only if topping up were itself intrinsi-
cally unjust. But the arguments for this
claim are weak. The sense that the poor
are in some way victimized by the
private purchase of drugs seems to lack
a foundation. And so it is the now
defunct policy that may rightfully be
condemned as unjust. Moreover, be-
cause it never made anyone any health-
ier, the policy made the NHS appear less
‘‘caring and compassionate,’’8 thereby
feeding the very distaste for the NHS
that it was supposed to avert.
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